




Subsidizing energy saving capital accumulation: 











 Aude POMMERET 











Some environmental policies, like tax credit, have tried to induce the acquisition of 
energy efficient units and the replacement of old energy inefficient vintages. How-
ever, they have faced the energy paradox that is a slow diffusion of new vintages. 
We develop a stochastic model of irreversible investment, in which firms also face 
embodied technological progress. We compare in a dynamic example a determinis-
tic and a stochastic model with embodied technological progress. In the embodied 
case under uncertainty, the option to postpone replacement becomes very large, 
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Global climate change has resulted in policy makers becoming more and more con-
cerned about energy conversation investments. Indeed, public policies, like tax-
incentives, have been developed, which aim at the adoption of energy saving ma-
chines and equipment. Nevertheless, these policies face the so-called “energy para-
dox”: very attractive investment opportunities in energy efficient capital are ignored 
by investors, even if these opportunities have very high ex-ante rates of return. The 
diffusion of apparently cost-effective energy-efficient technologies is very low. 
Empirically, it has been shown by Walsh (1987,1989) that tax incentives decrease 
investment and by Dubin and Henson (1988) that the relationship between invest-
ment and tax incentives is statistically insignificant. Such a lack of effectiveness has 
substantially reduced policy makers’ enthusiasm. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, Hasset and Metcalf (1992) explains the discrep-
ancy between tax incentives and investment using the combination of irreversibility 
of investment and uncertainty. They construct a model in which residential energy 
conservation investment is irreversible, and the price of energy as well as the cost of 
energy conservation capital are stochastic. In this framework, the authors study the 
decision of households to invest in one project. There is an option value to invest 
that leads to postponing the decision to invest. Households require a better envi-
ronment to acquire new energy-efficient machines than they would if there were no 
irreversibility or no uncertainty. This is why a tax incentive may not be sufficient to 
trigger investment. 
 
Nevertheless, such modelling only focuses on the household decision to invest, 
while energy conservation investment is also an issue for firms. Moreover, it only 
considers one project, which implies that it ignores the main grounds for invest-
ment. Investment is driven by two motives: capacity expansion and replacement. 
Pindyck (1988) proposes the first stochastic model of capacity expansion, in which 
investment is irreversible. His model deals with homogenous units, that is, all the 
machines are similar. Therefore, the firm has to reach full capacity before undertak-
ing investment, which seems to be an unrealistic assumption. Due to the assumption 
of homogenous units, the replacement of machines is ignored in his model. How-
ever, replacement is an important feature of investment decisions, and technological 
progress is highly embodied in new machines, i.e. it is investment-specific. Green-
wood et. al. (1997) argues that almost 60% of the US post-war growth can be ac-
counted for by investment-specific technological progress. Therefore, when exam-
ining possible explanations for the energy paradox, irreversibility and uncertainty 
are certainly part of the story, but the fact that the energy-saving technological pro-
gress is largely investment-specific should be considered as well. 
 
In this paper, we use a model developed in Pommeret and Cruz (2003) which exhib-
its these three characteristics (uncertainty, irreversibility and embodiment) to assess 
the efficiency of a tax credit. Investment is irreversible, the price of energy evolves 
stochastically, and new machines and equipment, due to embodied technological 
progress, are more efficient in terms of energy requirements. Capital and energy are 3 
assumed to be complementary. Furthermore, labour has no adjustment cost. We 
compare the effects of the tax credit we obtain in such a framework with those 
which result in a model of disembodied technological progress under uncertainty 
and those that emerge from the deterministic counterpart of the embodied case 
developed in Boucekkine and Pommeret (2001). 
 
Our results show that uncertainty, irreversibility and the embodied technological 
progress assumption are crucial to explain the low degree of tax credit effective-
ness. In a dynamic example, we compare the stochastic and deterministic cases of 
embodied/disembodied technological progress. In our example, firms reduce the 
optimal scrapping age with the tax credit; however, due to uncertainty, irreversibil-
ity and embodiment, the option to postpone the machines renders this impact almost 
negligible compared with those which exist in the deterministic case or in the dis-
embodied case under uncertainty. Even if the returns on new equipment and ma-
chines are high, the acquisition is postponed because of uncertainty, irreversibility 
and embodiment. This leads to a slowdown in the replacement and the diffusion of 
more energy-efficient machines. Our model, therefore, can provide some theoretical 
explanations for the empirical observation about the ineffectiveness of tax credit, 
and the so-called energy paradox. 
 
The deterministic model of embodied technological progress and the impact of a tax 
credit are presented in the next section. Section 3 describes the same model under 
uncertainty, and we also deduce the theoretical impact of tax credits. A dynamic 
example is performed in section 4 to compare the stochastic and deterministic cases 
in the disembodied and embodied models. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Optimal capital stock under embodied technological progress 
 
 
2.1.  Presentation of the model 
 
We consider that energy-saving technical progress is embodied in the new capital 





PtQt  Pet Et  wtLt  kIt e￿rtdt
 (1) 
 
subject to constraints taking embodiment into account : 
Pt  bQt￿￿ with   1    (2) 
Qt  AKt￿Lt1￿￿




     (4) 
Pet  Pe e￿t with   r     (5) 
Et  
t￿T￿t￿
t Ize￿￿zdz with   r
   (6) 
wt  w       (7) 
max 4 
It  dKt  0      ( 8 )  
Kt  Keff       (9) 
 
P(t) is the market price of the good produced by the firm, Q(t) is the production, the 
demand price elasticity is (- K(t) is capital, L(t) is labour. E(t) stands for the 
energy use and I(t) is investment; Pe(t) is energy price; the wage rate w and the pur-






energy-saving technical progress. We assume that there is no physical depreciation. 
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sumption in the exogenous growth literature since it permits a bounded objective 
function. 
 
The Cobb-Douglas production function exhibits constant returns to scale but there 
are operating costs whose size depends on the energy requirement of the capital: for 
any capital use K(t) there is a corresponding given energy requirement 
t e t K
￿ ￿ ) ( $K(t). Such a complementarity is assumed in order to be consistent with the 
results of several studies showing that capital and energy are complements (see, for 
instance, Hudson and Jorgenson (1974), or Berndt and Wood (1975)). 
 
T(t) denotes the age of the oldest machine still in use at t or scrapping age. More-
over, the capital variable is effective capital, since only active machines are taken 
into account in the definition of the capital stock. Note that only the new machines 
incorporate the latest technological advances, i.e. are more energy-saving than the 
machines acquired in the past. Such an assumption is consistent with Terborgh 
(1949) and Smith (1961), in which it is hypothesized that the operation cost of a 








in our model. 
 
We assume that labour may be adjusted immediately and without any cost and this 
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The vintage structure does matter in capital accumulation decisions, investment and 
scrapping. Noting that J(t)=T(t+J(t)) is the lifetime of a machine of vintage t, the 
problem may be transformed, following Malcomson (1975), into a more tractable 
one (see the Boucekkine and Pommeret, 2001) and the following first order condi-





￿￿1  Pe e￿￿￿￿t e￿r￿￿￿t￿d  kt   (11) 
                                                 
3 In contrast, Brems (1967) assumes a constant operation cost. 5 
BKt
￿￿1  Pe e￿￿￿t￿T￿t￿￿￿￿t
     (12) 
with      ) 1 ( 1 1 / ) 1 (           . Note that 0<  
 
Equation (11) gives the optimal investment rule according to which the firm should 
invest at time t until the discounted marginal productivity during the whole lifetime 
of the capital acquired in t exactly compensates for both its discounted operation 
cost and its marginal purchase cost in t. Equation (12) is the scrapping condition: it 
states that a machine should be scrapped as soon as its marginal productivity (which 
is the same for any machine whatever its age) no longer covers its operating cost 
(which rises with its age). 
 
It is shown in Boucekkine and Pommeret (2001) that if  " # 
-Smith 
result T*(t)=J*(t)=T is also reproduced in our case with T given by: 
e￿rT 
￿￿r
￿ 1  e￿￿T r
r￿￿  rk
Pe    (13) 
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2.2. Tax credit and optimal stock of capital 
 
The tax credit s is modelled as a cut in the investment acquisition cost. The optimal 
scrapping time then becomes: 
e￿rT 
￿￿r




and the optimal stock of capital can be deduced from equation (14). The behavior of 
the optimal scrapping time and of the optimal capital stock with respect to a tax 
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B    (16) 
 
First note that there is a negative relationship between  *
E K  and a given scrapping 
age T. The underlying mechanism is the following. The greater the age of the oper-
ated machines, the greater the operation cost associated with those machines, and 
thus the higher the marginal productivity required for all machines whatever their 
age due to the optimality condition (12). Since the production function exhibits de-
creasing returns with respect to capital, a higher marginal productivity can only be 
achieved by lowering the stock of capital. 
 
The tax credit affects the optimal capital stock through the optimal scrapping age: 
the higher the tax credit, the more attractive it becomes to scrap old machines and 
replace them with new ones whose costs are subsidized. This negative relationship 
between the tax credit and the scrapping age is expressed in equation (15). More-6 
over, the total effect of the credit tax on the effective stock of capital can be broken 
down into two parts : 
  
-A>0 results from the effect of the tax credit in the absence of embodied techno-
logical progress 
-B<0 results from the effect of the tax credit due to the embodied technological pro-
gress.  
 
On the one hand, embodiment makes it even more attractive to acquire new ma-
chines. On the other hand, it also encourages scrapping. This leads to an ambiguous 
effect on the effective stock of capital. In the simulations exercise proposed in the 
last section, the positive effect prevails. 
 
3. Embodied technological progress under uncertainty 
 
Now we consider the same programme with the exception that the energy price is 




￿ PtQt  Pet Et  wtLt  ktIt e￿rtdt   (17) 
 
subject to constraints taking uncertainty into account: 
 
Pt  bQt￿￿ with   1    (18) 
Qt  AKefft￿Lt1￿￿




Izdz       (20) 




Ize￿￿zdz with   r    (22) 
wt  w        ( 2 3 )  
It  dKt  0       (24) 






shocks. dz(t) is the increment of a standard Wiener process (E(dz)=0 and V(dz)=dt). 
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$
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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 indicates how strongly this price reacts to the 
shocks. 
 
3.1. The value of a marginal unit of capital 
 
Based on the Bellman equation which has to be satisfied, it is possible to derive the 
value of a unit of capital depending on the date of acquisition of this unit and on 
whether this unit is currently used or not (see Cruz and Pommeret (2003)). In the 
case of disembodied technological progress, the acquisition date of the unit is of no 
relevance. We must distinguish between the following values: 
 
max 7 
- V(Pe(t  is the value of a unit of capital at time t acquired at time   and cur-
rently used. 
 
-  is the value at time t of a unit of capital acquired at time   and not currently 
used (it is not currently providing any cash-flow). 
 
-O(t) is the value at time t of a unit that has not already been acquired. 
 
3.2. Optimality conditions 
 
In the case of disembodied technological progress (or no technological progress, see 
Pindyck (1988)), the firm must first decide whether to invest or not depending on 
the relative values of the desired capital stock (given the observed value of the un-
certain variable) and of the stock already installed. In the case in which it is not op-
timal to invest, the firm must then decide whether to use all the unit capital it has 
installed or only a part of it. Since any unit of capital displays the same characteris-
tics because technological progress benefits all units, the firm will decide to first 
reuse old units before investing in new ones. In a way, the decisions about using 
installed units and about investing in new ones are taken independently since there 
is no incentive for the firm to replace old units by new ones. 
 
This is no longer the case if technological progress is embodied because capital 
units differ according to their installation date. The intuition is the following: since 
a new capital unit may be a lot more energy efficient than an old one, i.e. saves en-
ergy, it may be attractive for the firm to stop using an old unit and invest in a new 
one even if there is an additional acquisition cost for the new one. Therefore, the 
firm will simultaneously have to decide whether to invest or not and to determine 
the maximum age of a machine still in use. Indeed, these two decisions are now 
closely linked. 
 
3.2.1. Utilization rule 
 
The firm uses an old machine acquired at time   until the realization of the energy is 
) ( * t Pe
E  such that it becomes indifferent whether it is used or unused: the value of 
the oldest machine used must be the same whether it is used or not. Since the model 
is stochastic, the transition between these two values of the unit must be smooth for 
the firm to be functioning at the optimum. These two conditions are the usual value 
matching and smooth pasting conditions. 




￿Pe￿t￿ for Pet  Pe￿Et      (27) 
Taking into account the Bellman equations V(t,  and  have to satisfy, this 









































 with  0 /
2



























 with  0 /
2
2       
 
The value of the option to stop using the unit  
2 ) ( ) ), ( ( 1
￿  t Pe t K b eff  negatively de-
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 &earlier the unit has been installed, the less value 
it has to have the opportunity to stop using it. 
 
3.2.2. Investment rule 
 
The firm invests for an energy price realization such that, for a given effective stock 
of capital, it is indifferent between acquiring one more unit and doing nothing. 
Therefore, it invests until the value of a newly used unit exactly compensates for the 
constant cost k to acquire it and for the value of the option to invest in the future the 
firm has to give up (it corresponds to the value matching condition). In order for the 
firm to be at the optimum of this stochastic program, the standard smooth pasting 
condition has to be satisfied as well. For given effective capital stock and technol-
ogy levels, these optimality conditions express the energy price level at which it is 
optimal for the firm to invest in a new unit. This expression may also be converted 
into that of the optimal effective stock of capital as a function of the observed en-
ergy price level and of the current level of technology. 




￿Pe￿t￿     ( 3 0 )  
 
When making investment decisions, firms do not care about how much capital they 
have, but about how much capital they decide to use. Due to the embodied technol-
ogy, it may be interesting for the firm to acquire new units that are more energy 
saving even if all the old units are not used. Under embodied technological pro-
gress, the installed stock of capital (which may be in excess) is no longer the deter-
minant for investment. What is more interesting is the effectively used stock of 
capital. Since the firm can determine the age of the oldest capital unit in use to ad-
just the used stock to its optimal level, the desired level of used capital always coin-
cides with the effective level and the expression for the desired level of effectively 
used capital is valid whatever the realization of the uncertain variable. This makes it 
possible to derive the expression of the optimal acquisition date of the oldest ma-
chine as a function of the energy price. 
 
3.3. Optimal effective capital stock 
 
Given the observed level of the energy price and the current state of the energy-
saving technology, it is optimal for the firm to have an effective capital stock equal 9 
to  ) ( * t Keff which is given by the following implicit equation (see Cruz and Pom-
meret (2003) for the derivation): 
 
BKeff












Note that, due to potential decreases in the optimal age of the oldest machine used, 
it is possible for the optimal effective capital stock to be decreasing even if the total 
installed stock of capital is irreversible (as we have already seen, under embodi-
ment, the installed stock of capital does not really matter as far as the firm’s deci-
sions are concerned). 
 
3.4. Optimal age of the oldest machine used 
 
Since, in this model, temporarily not using a machine is not associated with any 
cost, there is no incentive for the firm to definitively scrap any machine. Thus we 
only derive an optimal age for the oldest machine used but not really an optimal 
scrapping age. This is a significant departure from what is obtained in a determinis-
tic environment (see Boucekkine and Pommeret, 2001). Using equation (31) and 
taking into account the fact that the unit is only used if the cash-flow it provides is 
positive (see Cruz and Pommeret (2003) for the derivation), we can derive an im-
plicit expression for the optimal acquisition date of the oldest machine as a function 
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 (32) 
 
Given the observed level of the energy price and the current state of the energy-







renew the machines; replacement is postponed. It is also possible to see that a 
higher energy price reduces the age of the oldest machine; one could claim that the 
model can reproduce the ’’cleansing effect’’: firms would tend to use newer ma-
chines in periods of higher energy prices and eventually acquire new units. More-
over, for a given energy price, as time passes, new technology becomes available 
and we have seen that the optimal effective stock of capital increases. We can also 
use the optimal age to stop using new units. Defining T*=t- , equation (32) can 









3.5. Tax credit and optimal stock of capital 
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The behaviour of the optimal age of the oldest machine and of the optimal effective 
capital stock with respect to a tax credit are as follows :  
￿T￿￿t￿
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Now, in this stochastic case, the total effect on the effective stock of capital can be 
broken down into 3 parts: 
-A>0 results from the tax credit if technological progress is disembodied. 
-B’>0 results from the tax credit due to the embodied technological progress affect-
ing the option to invest in the future. Embodied technological progress increases the 
option value to invest in the future, therefore discouraging even more investment 
and reducing the effect of the tax credit. In the simulations exercise it can be shown 
that this effect is very strong and strongly reduces the effect of the tax credit. 
-C<0 results from the tax credit due to the option to reuse old units under embodied 
technological progress. Unambiguously, the tax credit increases the option to reuse 
old units (since the marginal cost is reduced by the tax credit), therefore favoring 
the effective stock of capital. 
 
The impact of the tax credit on the optimal age can be also divided into 3 parts: 
-D<0 gives the effect of the tax credit in a deterministic framework: lowering the 
price of new machines due to the tax credit creates an incentive to scrap older ma-
chines and therefore reduces the age of the oldest machine. 
-E is the correction one should include because of the option to invest in new ma-
chines. A priori it has an ambiguous effect on the age of the oldest machine. 
-C<0 results from the option to reuse machines. The tax credit reduces this option 
therefore increasing the age of the oldest machine. 
 
In the dynamic example proposed in the next section, E>0, and the total effect of 
the tax credit is to lower the age of the oldest machine. 11 
4. Dynamics of the effective stock of capital, age of the oldest machine and tax 
credit 
 
In this dynamic example, simulations are driven over 100 periods. In order to get 
the dynamics of Pe(t), a geometric Brownian motion is simulated using parameters 
" "*
2  =0.04 and Pe(0)=10 as a starting value. Figure 1 shows the result for 
Pe(t). The firm observes the energy price and derives how much effective capital to 
use. It then has to decide whether to use more or fewer old units and, at the same 
time, decide whether it should invest in new units or not. 
  
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the total stock of capital in the deterministic case. It 
exhibits the usual echoes effects. Since the optimal effective stock of capital is con-
stant, the positive effect of the tax credit accumulates over time. Considering the 
total capital stock in a stochastic framework with disembodied technological pro-
gress, Figure 3 leads to a dynamics consistent with investment occurring infre-
quently and in bursts. Due to tax credits, the initial investment is higher. Since in 
this case technological progress reduces the energy requirements of all installed 
machines, the tax credit unambiguously results in higher initial investment and 
higher capital over the whole period. However, the positive effect of the credit tax is 
less striking when one takes into account the fact that technological progress is em-
bodied in new machines. In fact, the effective total stock of capital is barely in-
creased in the model of embodied technological progress under uncertainty (Figure 
4); also note that firms leave their scrapping policy almost unchanged (Figures 6 
and 7). 
 
Figure 5 compares the percentage increase in the total stock of capital over time, 
depending on whether we consider a stochastic environment or a deterministic one 
and whether technological progress is disembodied or embodied. First note that 
under disembodiment, the tax credit is more efficient under uncertainty than in a 
deterministic framework. This is clearly due to the fact that we take capacity expan-
sion into account since it contradicts the result of Hasset and Metcalf (1992) based 
on a single investment project. Second, introducing embodiment into the stochastic 
environment drastically reduces the effect of the tax credit under uncertainty while 
the reverse takes place in a deterministic environment. This means that taking em-
bodiment into account is crucial when assessing the effectiveness of a tax credit. 12 
 















Figure 2: Total capital dynamics with and without tax credit; 









































“Kcer” stands for the embodied capital stock under certainty 13 
 
Figure 3: Total capital dynamics with and without tax credit; 













































“Kuncdis” represents the disembodied capital stock under uncertainty 
 
Figure 4: Total capital dynamics with and without tax credit; 













“Kunc” stands for the embodied capital stock under uncertainty 
 14 
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“Kunc” stands for the embodied capital stock under uncertainty 
“Kcer” stands for the embodied capital stock under certainty 
“Kuncdis” stands for the disembodied capital stock under uncertainty 
“Kcerdis” stands for the disembodied capital stock under certainty 
 
 














“Tunc” stands for the optimal age of the oldest machine under uncertainty 
“Tcer” stands for the optimal age of the oldest machine under certainty 
 15 
Figure 7: Percentage decrease in the optimal scrapping age 












“Tunc” stands for the optimal age of the oldest machine under uncertainty 




Policies focusing on the implementation of energy-efficient machines face the so-
called energy paradox: efficient machines in terms of energy requirements, even if 
profitable for the firms, have a very low diffusion rate. Furthermore, some of these 
policies, such as tax credits, have been shown to be inefficient. In this paper, we 
propose a stochastic model that accounts for heterogeneous units and technological 
progress being investment-specific. We show that the assumption of embodied 
technological progress is very important when assessing the effectiveness of a tax 
credit. The existence of an option value (due to uncertainty and irreversibility) is not 
sufficient to explain the relative inefficiency of the tax credit in a capacity expan-
sion framework. Indeed, in the disembodied case, the total impact on the capital 
stock is even higher than in the deterministic embodied case. Due to the combina-
tion of the option value and of embodiment, firms postpone replacement, and fol-
lowing a tax credit, they do not significantly increase their capital stock and reduce 
the scrapping age of the oldest machines. When devising energy conservation poli-
cies therefore, policy makers should not only take the option value into account as a 
feature of the investment decision. They should consider embodiment as well. 16 
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